Introduction
In little over a decade, Japan's trade policy has experienced a dramatic transformation: from a critic of regionalism to an avid preferential trader eager to build an ever expanding FTA network. Japan's decision to join the FTA frenzy is best explained as an instance of policy diffusion whereby the prior actions of other FTA nations created strong pressure for Japan to reverse its half century of exclusive support for the multilateral system. The literature on policy diffusion has identified two major forces for the spread of economic policies (in this case preferential trade accords): ideational dissemination (emulation) whereby new policy paradigms become predominant, or competition whereby the search for relative advantage induces governments to embrace policies likely to yield economic, political, or rule-making benefits.
In this chapter, I argue that competitive dynamics explain best Japan's FTA policy shift. Japan has used its FTAs to meet three main challenges: 1) to restore or advance the competitive advantage of internationally-oriented business sectors in selected overseas markets; 2) to disseminate a distinct Japanese approach to preferential economic integration different both from the American and Chinese FTAs; and 3) to hone its regional leadership credentials vis-à-vis China by reaching out to Southeast Asian nations, and inviting extra-regional partners to integration talks in order to balance China's influence. However, the need to respond to multiple competitive pressures has taxed heavily Japanese FTA policy. The Japanese government has confronted a major dilemma: whether to meet the demands of the business sector to negotiate a bilateral FTA with China that maximizes economic returns, or whether to heed the calls from politicians that see in China an emerging rival and in economic integration an important venue to stake Japan's claim to regional leadership.
Moreover, while the origins of Japan's FTA policy cannot be found in isolated domestic pressures, it is undeniable that national policymaking patterns influence heavily how Japan articulates its FTA strategy. The traditional bottom-up policy making style gives interest groups (e.g. from business and agriculture) influence over the direction of Japanese trade policy. However, two recent developments are likely to influence Japan's ability to meet competitive pressures through FTA policy: the attempts to centralize policymaking in order to decrease the power of the farm subgovernment (and to explore intra-agricultural divisions), and the growing politicization of foreign economic policy with the weakening of the traditional division of economics and politics and the pursuit of security driven FTAs. This paper is organized as follows. Section one provides a brief overview of Japanese FTA policy highlighting the main characteristics of Japanese free trade agreements. Section two focuses on the FTA policy shift in the late 1990s in order to assess the competing hypotheses on FTA dissemination: emulation versus competition (in addition to the null hypothesis of independent decision-making). Section three highlights the ever expanding economic objectives in Japanese FTA policy. Section four looks at Japan's new legalism through the FTA venue. Section five focuses on the impact of SinoJapanese competition on patterns of East Asian integration. The last section concludes with a reflection of the impact of these multiple competitive pressures on Japan's FTA policy.
I. Overview of Japan's FTA initiatives
For most of the postwar period, the Japanese government regarded the multilateral trading system as the vehicle to secure market access abroad for Japanese enterprises, criticized trade regionalism as harmful to the GATT's principle of non-discrimination, and played a passive role in the definition of trade governance rules in the multilateral forum (Searight, 1999) . In the past decade, however, all these core understandings in Japanese trade policy have been thoroughly revised as the Japanese government now regards FTAs as supportive of the multilateral system and capable of producing deeper liberalization; is bent on fleshing out a multi-track trade policy with concurrent negotiations at the bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels; and has used proactively the WTO's dispute settlement mechanisms and is eager to partake in the dissemination of new trade and investment rules (Pekkanen, 2008) .
The adoption of an FTA track in Japan's trade policy was particularly striking.
Roughly a decade after first entertaining the possibility of negotiating preferential trade accords, Japan has rapidly built an FTA network: as of April 2008, Japan had five FTAs in effect (Singapore, Mexico, Malaysia, Chile and Thailand); had signed preferential trade deals with Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, and ASEAN; and was in active negotiations with GCC nations, Australia, Switzerland, India and Vietnam (see Table 1 ).
It is clear from this table that bilateral FTAs gained traction first since Japan more nimbly lined up trade agreements with individual Southeast Asian nations and Mexico and Chile; while negotiations with ASEAN as a whole proceeded slowly, and the initiative to launch an East Asian FTA (comprised by ASEAN+6 members) has not yet materialized, given disagreements with China over the core membership of the EAS integration project. On the other hand, the volume of trade and investment flows comprised by these bilateral FTAs is rather modest -never exceeding the 4% ceiling (with the exception of the FTA with Korea which is deadlocked), while the ASEAN wide FTA promises to yield more economic benefits.
Another noteworthy characteristic of Japanese FTAs is their broad issue scope.
The Japanese government has attempted to include multiple WTO plus commitments in areas such as intellectual property, government procurement, temporary entry of business people, and customs facilitation. But the trademark issue of Japan's trade agreements is the economic cooperation chapter (covering areas such as science and technology, small enterprises, human resource development, and improvement of the business climate), so much so that the Japanese government has coined a different term to refer to its preferential trade deals: Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Despite the attempt to negotiate encompassing FTAs, Table 1 shows that the implementation of this Japanese formula has not been completely homogeneous. Reflecting the high priority the Malaysian government attaches to its bumiputra policy (of giving priority to ethnic Malays on government contracts and hiring practices), the Japan-Malaysia FTA does not include WTO plus provisions on the elimination of performance requirements and excludes government procurement.
1 The trade agreement with Chile includes provisions 1 Underscoring the interconnectedness of FTA negotiations, Malaysia's uncompromising position vis-à-vis Japan reflected also its concern that any concession to Japan would become the de facto starting point in subsequent negotiations with the United States and India. Japan. In the end, Singapore was selected as Japan's first FTA partner largely due to Singapore's offer to exclude agriculture from the talks (Terada, 2006: 1) .
3 Although in the past MITI officials had informally discussed the possibility of signing a bilateral trade accord with the United States, no initiative materialized from those discussions (Munakata, 2006 , Krauss, 2000 . 4 Author interview with former senior METI official, Tokyo, May 2006 Undeterred by the opposition of the agricultural lobby, Keidanren continued to demand an FTA with Mexico (Keidanren, 1999 (Keidanren, , 2000 . Japan merely bound the zero percent tariffs that were de facto in effect (Lincoln, 2004 ).
This was a major advance considering the strong clout that the agricultural lobby (the 5 For a discussion of Keidanren's role in promoting the FTA policy shift and its position regarding talks with Singapore, Korea, and Mexico see Yoshimatsu (2005) .
iron triangle of agricultural cooperatives, ruling party politicians, and farm bureaucrats) has had over trade policy. The extreme bureaucratic sectionalism and the informal norm of unanimity has given the agricultural lobby veto power over Japan's international negotiations involving agricultural liberalization (Fukui, 1978 , Searight, 1999 . In fact, it took an unprecedented top-down intervention by then Prime Minister Koizumi to break the deadlock over meager agricultural concessions in talks with Mexico. Undoubtedly, some structural changes also facilitated this breakthrough: such as the contraction of the farming population, intra-agricultural rifts, 6 and changes in the electoral system deemed to weaken the influence of the farm vote (e.g. redistricting to correct rural overrepresentation, and shift to single member districts to encourage issue-based electoral competition and not pork-barrel).
But far from representing the defeat of Japanese agricultural protectionism, FTA policy reflects a political compromise whereby the agricultural lobby does not veto the preferential trade agreements but makes sure that its primordial interests are protected.
For instance, in all Japanese FTAs key primary commodities (rice, sugar, wheat, plywood) are off limits, and even in the case of Mexico, tariff-rate quotas (TRQs) were implemented for the most sensitive products (pork, beef, chicken, oranges, and orange juice) and no preferential tariff for chicken was established by the signing of the agreement, lest Thai trade officials use that preferential tariff in their own FTA negotiations with Japan. 7 The recent launch of FTA talks with Australia could indeed represent a turning point since it is the first time Japan is negotiating with a major supplier of agricultural goods in the Japanese market (representing 10% of all Japanese agricultural imports). However, the use of "exclusions" and "renegotiations" is likely to continue as Australian trade officials have acknowledged that the sensitivities of Japan's agricultural products ought to be factored in the negotiations (Joint study, 2006: 10). 8 6 For instance, a government strategy has been to foster competitive Japanese agricultural exports in niche markets to weaken the opposition to FTAs. Naoi and Krauss (manuscript) emphasize the importance of these intra-sectoral divisions. 7 Interview with officials from Mexico's Secretaría de Economía, Mexico City, May 2005.
8 Labor mobility is another controversial issue in Japan's FTAs with Philippines and Thailand. The opposition of the Ministry of Labor and the Nurse Association has for instance resulted in strict Japanese certification requirements that will make it unlikely to have a large number of applicants (Pempel and Urata, 2006: 88) .
This analysis of Japan's FTA policy shift underscores the importance of competitive pressures (in particular the perceived need to cope with trade and investment diversion effects from proliferating FTAs), and the central role that internationalized business sectors and trade bureaucrats played in championing the new policy. It also underscores how international diffusion pressures must be channeled through domestic policy-making channels, which in the case of Japan, meant the cooptation of the agricultural lobby into the new FTA policy by sheltering the most sensitive commodities from liberalization. Japan's ability to meet international competitive pressures through FTA policy is very much influenced by these domestic political constraints. And these internal political battles are likely to intensify as the degree of ambition in Japanese FTA policy has grown quickly: from the original defensive goals to encompass broader economic, legal, and political objectives.
III. Japan's FTA policy through the logic of economic competition

From defending to expanding market access abroad
Soon after the initial policy shift, Japanese companies became interested in using
FTAs to revamp their production networks in East Asia in order to achieve long-standing goals of integrating and streamlining their regional production networks, and to forestall the advances of rival MNCs in Southeast Asian countries, which in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis had courted more aggressively foreign direct investment and export production to increase foreign exchange earnings (Manger, 2005) . 9 FTAs would facilitate local and regional supply of parts (to decrease reliance on expensive imported parts from Japan) and would allow Japanese affiliates in the region to enjoy the benefits of specialization and economies of scale by serving larger regional markets. In this way, FTAs were deemed essential to maintain the competitive presence of Japanese multinationals in the region, especially in countries like Thailand were American firms were awarded national treatment status through the Treaty of Amity and Economic 9 It is important to note that not all ASEAN nations responded to the economic crisis with liberalization of their markets. Malaysia followed the opposite path by imposing greater restrictions on investment and continuing to promote the national car project (Shimokawa, 2004) . While Japanese auto firms were not facing the competition from incoming foreign multinationals in Malaysia, they still suffered from discriminatory treatment in favor of the national industry and were eager to integrate their operations in Malaysia to the regional production network. An FTA would help them accomplish these objectives.
Relations, and were Chinese exporters would soon enjoy preferential access as the China-ASEAN negotiations continued to move forward (Keidanren, 2003) .
Bilateral FTAs with the largest ASEAN nations (Thailand, Philippines, Malaysia) were important vehicles to achieve both the proactive (rationalization of production networks and development of regional export platforms) and defensive (keep up with the competition from Chinese products and Western multinationals) goals of Japanese
companies. Yet, in one crucial area the demands of the business community have not been met: negotiating an FTA with China. Given the importance of China as a top destination for Japanese FDI and as an export platform to service regional and global markets, it is not surprising that in every survey of Japanese firms China is selected as the top priority for FTA talks (JETRO, 2003 , Kajita, 2004 , JBIC, 2005 . Among the concrete reasons to negotiate a bilateral FTA with China, Japanese enterprises mention: tariff elimination, customs simplification, codification of investment rules, deregulation and administrative transparency and intellectual property protection (JETRO, 2006: 11) .
A much more expansive definition of competitive economic goals to be achieved through FTAs has in fact taken place recently, as the Japanese business community has begun to demand preferential trade negotiations with its largest trading partners: China, the United States and Europe. In the latter two cases, a major concern of Japanese enterprises is to keep up with competition from South Korea who has already signed an agreement with the United States, and is currently negotiating with the European Union.
Keidanren, therefore, noted that "if the U.S.-Korea FTA, currently under negotiation, is concluded and brought into effect Japanese companies will be placed at a marked competitive disadvantage relative to Korean companies when conducting business with the U.S." and "if South Korea, which is competing with Japan in automobiles, electronic appliances, and other industrial sectors, signs a FTA with the EU, leaving Japan lagging behind, it will cause huge damage" (Keidanren, 2006: 2 and 2007:6 , emphasis mine).
Evidently, competition with its two neighbors in Northeast Asia has affected the direction of Japanese FTA policy by increasing the premium of speeding up negotiations with ASEAN, and embarking on FTA talks with the United States and Europe. Reflecting these competitive pressures, METI announced in the spring of 2007 that concrete steps will be taken to launch FTA feasibility studies with these industrialized nations.
However, a fierce domestic political battle is to be expected between advocates and detractors of FTA policy in Japan, given the large adjustment costs likely to ensue from negotiating with these large economies. 10 Once more Japan is confronted with the dilemma of keeping up with international competition via FTAs while dealing with sizable domestic political constraints.
Export protectionism in Japan's FTAs: rules of origin
Firms can use FTAs to out-compete their rivals by resorting to non-transparent protection in the form of rules of origin. Interestingly, both Souminen and Esteveadordal (2004) and Cheong and Cho (2006) reach the conclusion that Japan has adopted stringent rules of origin in its FTAs. A restrictiveness index for a sample of FTAs (which takes into account the different rules to document substantial transformation such as change in tariff classification, regional content, and specified processes, plus clauses on accumulation and de minimis) places NAFTA at the top (0.67), followed by the EUMexico (0.60), Japan-Mexico (0.54), Japan-Singapore (0.49), Korea-Chile (0.47), and Korea-Singapore (0.44) (Cheong and Cho, 2006: 22) . While these studies offer a comparative view on aggregate levels of restrictiveness, it is unclear from them in which ways certain Japanese industries have lobbied for tough rules of origin and for what specific purposes.
Although only one example, the active lobbying campaign of the Japanese Textile Federation in FTA talks with Southeast Asian nations does provide a window on the use of these devices to shelter domestic markets. The Japanese Textile Federation -concerned over an import surge of Chinese products through ASEAN nations-has endorsed a "fabric-forward" rule of origin in order to limit the duty-free import of garments; and engaged in private diplomacy to seek the understanding of counterpart textile associations in the region. The Thai garment industry countered that with such rule of origin it would not be possible to export clothing to Japan since Thailand does not have the technological capability in weaving, dying, and finishing processes for cloth manufacture, so it offered as a better alternative the U.S. formula which nominally was more restrictive ("yarn-forward"), but in fact offered through the "short-supply list" the possibility of counting certain imported cloth towards Thai origin (Japan Textile Federation, 2006: 54) . And in the opinion of a Thai textile company executive, the offer to use a cumulative ROO for the ASEAN wide FTA was an empty promise since Thailand does not import cloth from Philippines, Indonesia or Singapore. It would be "like watching a banquet that cannot be eaten" (Japan Textile Association, 2006: 61) .
From the point of view of the Japanese Textile Federation, the strong opposition of the Thai garment industry was due mostly to its desire to maintain its leverage vis-à- 
IV. Japan's FTA policy through the logic of legal competition
Legalization in international trade governance has proceeded abreast as governments rely on hard law obligations instrumentally (to obtain actionable commitments on issues of interest) and strategically (to keep up with legalized trade tactics of competitors). Japan has been no exception to this broader pattern, and has abandoned its previous insistence on a consensual approach for regional trade agreements (a la APEC) in favor of FTAs with well developed dispute settlement mechanisms.
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A major objective of Japan FTA policy has been the desire to gain leverage in the definition and dissemination of international rules on trade and investment across all trade forums. Indeed, a key MITI official involved in the 1998 intra-ministry deliberations on FTA policy noted that the countries lagging behind the FTA race where precisely the passive countries in negotiations at Geneva. In his view, FTA policy offered an opportunity to reenergize Japan's trade policy and to adopt a much more proactive position on trade and investment rule-making. 12 In this endeavor, MITI bureaucrats enjoyed full support from large business, as Keidanren early on pushed for FTAs in order 11 For an analysis of Japan's shift in favor of legalism at the multilateral level see Pekkanen (2003) . 12 Interview with senior ex-MITI official, Tokyo, May 2006.
to propagate legal rules facilitating the operation of Japanese businesses overseas (Keidanren, 2000) .
Japan's competitive legal strategy through FTAs has aimed to amend WTO provisions deemed harmful to Japanese corporate interests (anti-dumping), to spread new rules that can later on be incorporated at the WTO level (investment), and to elicit from developing countries preferential commitments that surpass their WTO obligations in areas such as government procurement or intellectual property protection, and in so doing compete with China for the dissemination of a distinct Japanese FTA model that has a much broader issue scope and a larger degree of legalization.
Regarding the reform of existing WTO rules, Japanese government and industry have long been dissatisfied with the multilateral anti-dumping code as they deemed that
American and European anti-circumvention practices and dumping methodologies resulted in discriminatory treatment of Japanese companies. 13 Japanese business interests identified in FTAs an opportunity to reform antidumping practices by incorporating in these agreements clauses on the mutual non-application of antidumping duties, or by adopting new antidumping rules that could later on serve as a yardstick for reform at the WTO level (Keidanren, 2000: 6) . Interestingly, when the prospects for some reform of the antidumping code appeared more promising in the Doha Round, the Japanese business community dropped this negotiation objective in the FTA front. 14 However, Keidanren continues to monitor closely the treatment of antidumping in other FTAs and is quite prepared to bring the issue back to the FTA front if favorable opportunities exist: "In the negotiations for the U.S.-Korea FTA currently under way it appears that the Korean side aims to ensure that restrictions of some kind are imposed on the U.S. ability to invoke antidumping measures, though the U.S. has never agreed to include such a provision in the FTAs it has concluded so far. If a similar provision were to be included in a Japan-U.S. EPA, that would be of great benefit to Japanese companies that have been suffering from protectionist U.S. antidumping duties" (Keidanren, 2006: 6 Other areas where Japan is actively seeking WTO plus commitments from its FTA counterparts are government procurement, services, and intellectual protection. FTA negotiations with countries not partaking in the WTO's plurilateral agreement on government procurement are frequently the only way in which Japanese companies can gain a foothold on these markets and/or to be able to offer competitive bids. The Japanese business community has also made national treatment a key priority in its service negotiations in FTAs, and has called for a tightening of enforcement mechanisms against counterfeiting in the intellectual property provisions of free trade agreements (Keidanren, 2006) . Japan has succeeded in negotiating FTAs with multiple WTO plus provisions on investment, intellectual property, services, and economic cooperation. However, as noted before, Japan was unable to secure substantial commitments on government procurement, services, and performance requirements in its FTAs with Malaysia and ASEAN.
Moreover, it is important to note that Japanese FTAs reflect in fact a mix of legalism and voluntarism, rather than an outright endorsement of pure hard law. Japan has been unwilling to undertake binding and actionable commitments on competition policy, customs procedures, financial services, and economic cooperation. This last chapter in particular contains clauses on human resource development, promotion of small and medium sized enterprises, and improvement of the business climate, which are of interest to Japanese corporations in order to ensure the availability of high skilled labor and supporting industries, and to gain direct access to host government officials to voice specific grievances hindering the climate of operations. But all of these cooperation clauses are non-binding, and there are no direct ties to ODA disbursements either.
Japan's avoidance of hard obligations in the economic cooperation chapter is most likely due to one-side nature of these commitments: as the industrialized partner in these FTAs
Japan is expected to make most contributions. The co-existence of legalism and voluntarism in Japanese FTAs, therefore, corroborates Kahler's depiction of legalization strategies in East Asia as instrumental, in that legalization is a strategy that can be activated or deactivated to suit the competitive interests of corporations and governments.
Japan's legal competitive strategy has yielded an FTA approach different from both the NAFTA model and Chinese trade agreements. Compared to the United States, Japan has shied away from binding obligations on financial liberalization, has not been interested in incorporating labor and environmental standards, and has emphasized an explicit cooperation/development approach to trade negotiations. On the other hand, Japan's FTAs are more comprehensive in terms of issue scope and legalistic (in terms of defining precise obligations and establishing dispute settlement mechanisms) than Chinese FTAs, which have been characterized as brief, vague, and with an emphasis on conciliation rather than formal dispute settlement (Antkiewicz and Whalley, 2005) . In this way, China and Japan are offering different "models" of regional integration, and the race is on to see which one disseminates further and fastest. A common perception in Japanese FTA policymaking circles is that China is prepared to negotiate narrower FTAs (affecting mostly tariffs on goods), but that it skillfully lured East Asia by offering agricultural concessions through the early harvest program. On the other hand, Japan is interested not only in tariff elimination but rule-setting, and the spread of high-quality FTAs is a key priority for government and business. 15 Thus, the dissemination of a distinct Japanese approach to preferential trading is a central concern in Japan's competitive FTA strategy, especially towards China, the other possible focal point for regional integration.
V. Japan's FTA policy through the logic of political competition
Japan's forays into trade regionalism are also influenced by broader political and security considerations, especially two central concerns of its foreign policy: the maintenance of the U.S. alliance (even as Japan departs from past precedent and endorses now regional integration bodies that do not include the United States), and the need to respond to China's rising stature in the region (which could eclipse Japan in terms of defining the tempo, substance, and membership of the regional integration process).
The slowdown of trans-pacific cooperation forums (APEC and ARF) and the proliferation of Asian FTAs do represent a significance challenge for the United States to remain actively engaged in the region and for the United States and Japan to reiterate the centrality of their bilateral bond. For these reasons, Armitage and Nye's report (2007: 18) on strengthening the US-Japan alliance singles out the negotiation of a comprehensive bilateral FTA as one of the most effective economic means to achieve both objectives.
On the other hand, Sino-Japanese relations are in a moment of redefinition as both countries are confronted with the new realities of Chinese economic take-off and military buildup and rising nationalism in both Japan and China. Wan (2006: 334) notes that Japan and China have moved away from the friendship framework to a situation of limited rivalry in that they both have expanded their political, economic, and military objectives and view each other as an obstacle towards their realization. As Mochizuki (2007: 761, 764) explains, fashioning an adequate response to China's rise has generated lively debate in Japan. The two predominant strategic options considered by Japanese elites -cooperative or competitive engagement-include prescriptions for Japan's regional integration policy. According to the former, the East Asian Summit must provide a vehicle to achieve a community where both countries renounce a bid for hegemony, and where the two tier structure (ASEAN+3 as backbone for integration, and the broader EAS as a supportive forum) bridges the Sino-Japanese positions. The latter, however, views the exclusion of the United States from the EAS negatively, signaling a preference for trans-Pacific options.
Thus, as Japan fleshes out its FTA policy it must aim for a delicate political compromise between shoring up its key security alliance with the United States, displaying a commitment to the construction of Asian regional integration institutions, and striking the right balance between competition and cooperation in its dealings with
China. This uneasy mix of political and security pressures has influenced Japanese FTA policy in at least three important dimensions: the selection of FTA partners, the competitive courting of Southeast Asian nations, and the competitive bid to influence the EAS agenda.
Political criteria in FTA partner selection
From the outset, political criteria have influenced the decision to select or bypass certain countries as FTA partners. As mentioned before, MITI bureaucrats leaned in favor of South Korea as the first FTA counterpart, largely because they deemed this choice an easier political sell among politicians and domestic audiences. In characterizing FTAs as essentially "political coalitions" (Ogita, 2003: 241) , MITI was hoping to consolidate the new trade policy by pointing to the larger benefits for Japan's regional diplomacy. The Japan-Korea FTA was desirable precisely because it could "kick-off the new stage in East Asian relations in that economic dynamism can make an opportunity to go beyond bitterness (Fukagawa, 2000:7) .
16
The decision in the spring of 2007 to initiate FTA negotiations with Australia after a protracted process of consultations and feasibility studies is also explained along political lines. As Terada (2005: 16) shows, Prime Minister Koizumi decided to launch an official FTA feasibility study in order to reciprocate for the dispatch of Australian 16 However, as these FTA talks reached deadlock in November 2004 due to disagreements over the level of agricultural (and especially fishery) liberalization in Japan and concerns among the Korean small enterprises with the trade adjustment burden, these expectations were not met. The further deterioration of bilateral relations due to territorial disputes and the PM Koizumi visits to the Yasukuni Shrine made it difficult for the political leaders of both countries to intervene and break the impasse over these market access concerns (Katada and Solís, 2006). soldiers to protect the activities of Japanese Self-Defense forces in Iraq (and also in keeping with the larger strategic goals that have motivated Japan to insist on Australia joining the EAS as discussed below). The security-economic connection was evident in the joint announcement by both governments to launch FTA talks and sign a "JapanAustralia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation." This is a remarkable initiative for Japan since it had not established a close security partnership in the postwar period with any other country besides the United States. In fact, some agricultural watchers in Japan have decried the security-economic link for sacrificing agriculture for the sake of expanded security ties between Japan, Australia, and the United States (Ono, 2007) . 
Competitive courting of Southeast Asia
In addition to economic considerations, Southeast Asia is of great importance to Japan and China to achieve political and diplomatic goals. China is keen to cultivate relations with Southeast Asian countries in order to mitigate containment policies of the United States, discredit the "China Threat" theory, and further isolate Taiwan (Yang, 2003: 315) . For these reasons, since 1997 China is credited with pursuing a "charm strategy" that has included refraining from devaluation during the Asian financial crisis, negotiating an FTA with ASEAN, signing a code of conduct on territorial disputes in the South China Sea in 2002, and signing ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) a year later (Teufel Dreyer, 2006 : 545, De Santis, 2005 .
On the other hand, after the end of the Cold War Japan's more activist diplomacy in East Asia aimed to play a mediating role between antagonists (e.g. in Cambodia), bring stability to the region, and counter China's growing influence (Peng, 2001: 120-121) . In this way, Japan has endeavored to expand its ties to the region beyond economic diplomacy to promote cooperation in many more areas such as environmental protection and political/security dialogues. Such was the spirit of the Hashimoto doctrine of January 1997 which proposed regular summits with ASEAN leaders to discuss a broad range of issues. Later that year, Japan displayed activism through the Miyazawa initiative disbursing $30 billion dollars to countries in the region undergoing financial crisis. In 2003 and marking the 50 th anniversary of Japan-ASEAN relations, the Tokyo declaration expressed the desire to work towards the realization of an East Asian Community (Yeo, 2006) .
In this context of heightened attention to Southeast Asia, FTAs afford China and
Japan the opportunity to emphasize the joint gains of economic cooperation with ASEAN nations, in ways that allow them to advance important diplomatic goals (the acceptance of China's peaceful rise thesis, and the mitigation of regional distrust towards Japan's leadership initiatives) (Hoadley and Yang, 2007, Munakata, 2001 ). The competitive dynamics at work are transparent in the series of moves and counter-moves that have Importantly, there is a widespread perception in the region that Japan lags behind China in its ability to use FTAs to score diplomatic goals. This is evident in both the FTA and TAC fronts (Terada, 2006a) . After Koizumi's high profile announcement in January 2002, the Japanese government decided to proceed first with bilateral trade agreements with the larger ASEAN countries, according to Munakata (2006: 121) promote democracy and human rights in the region and it could have negative implications for its alliance with the United States (Terada, 2006a: 13-14) . According to Yeo, it is the "US first, Asia second" mentality which hinders Japan's ability to lead in the path towards East Asian regionalism (Yeo, 2006) .
Undoubtedly, one of the most important consequences of the competitive courting of Southeast Asia is the increased leverage of ASEAN nations. Fearing marginalization by negotiating with much larger trade partners, ASEAN countries have deliberately encouraged competition among the larger Northeast Asian countries. 18 This strategy has paid off in that ASEAN+3 has emerged as the nominal anchor for the region-wide integration process, and ASEAN's agenda has prevailed in defining the criteria to 17 Other FTA watchers attribute Japan's decision to pursue the bilaterals first to a bureaucratic split in that MITI preferred the subregional FTA to avoid the deleterious effects of crisscrossing rules of origin, but MOFA wanted the bilateral route in order to cement relations with target nations by framing this initiative as a broad diplomatic effort. And according to other FTA experts, since the nature of economic involvement in the region is very different for Japan and China (with substantial Japanese FDI in these countries) it made sense to proceed bilaterally to address more fully the market access concerns of Japanese MNCs in each country. Author interviews with officials from MITI, MOFA, JETRO, and Japanese academics, Tokyo, summer 2005. See also Solís (2006) for a report on these rounds of interviews. 18 Munakata (2006: 122) cites Singapore's trade minister George Yeo: "On the question of East Asian FTA, it will be 3+10 rather than 10+3. The economic size of the three is much larger than the ten. ASEAN will be marginalized. Therefore, we prefer 10+1, in a position to deal with Japan, China and ROK separately." participate in the East Asia summit: be a dialogue partner of ASEAN, sign the TAC, and have substantial relations with ASEAN.
Conflicting blueprints for East Asian trade integration
The East Asian summit has become the latest theater for Sino-Japanese The desire to dilute Chinese influence in a future East Asian FTA is a large consideration behind Japan's proposal. First of all, the three members that Japan sought to incorporate into the East Asian regional integration process are all democracies, and this reinforces the argument that in creating a community, members should share values regarding democracy or human rights protection (Hatakeyama, 2006) . In this way, Japan seems to be pointing to the potential weaknesses of China as a regional leader on two central areas: strong rule of law and democratic governance. Second, the inclusion of Australia reflects Japan's desire to upgrade bilateral security relations, consolidate trilateral defense talks including the United States, and counter a rising China (Terada, 2005: 12) . Third, the incorporation of India, another large and booming emerging economy, prevents China from becoming the sole spokesperson for developing countries in the EAS.
While Japan succeeded in gaining admission to the EAS for Australia, New
Zealand, and India, the designation of ASEAN+3 as the main vehicle for community building (with the EAS playing a supportive role) represents an endorsement of the Chinese view to retain a more narrow East Asian focus in the integration process. 19 It is not clear yet whether the EAS will emerge as a forceful engine for integration capable of generating substantial commitments from its members on a multitude of issues beyond trade and investment liberalization. But what does seem certain is that Sino-Japanese competition to define the substance of East Asian integration will continue in the foreseeable future.
Conclusions
This paper has argued that the competitive diffusion mechanism explains best the original policy shift and subsequent evolution of Japanese FTA strategy. Therefore, this concluding section identifies the most important competitive pressures and correlates them to FTA outcomes; discusses how international diffusion pressures are processed through domestic policy-making channels, and addresses the central dilemma for Japanese policymakers as economic and political competition seem to pull FTA policy in different directions.
Competition with whom over what?
In the economic realm, Japanese firms -especially in the automobile and In terms of rule-making, the United States and China have been the main targets of competition. Towards the United States, the dissemination of alternative antidumping rules has been an important concern, and Japan has consciously differentiated its brand of FTAs by emphasizing the trade facilitation agenda and economic cooperation clauses.
Nowhere is the attempt to propagate a distinct model of economic integration more prominent than in Japan's competition with China to become the focal point of regional integration. Japanese officials have emphasized the higher quality of their FTAs (broader issue scope and binding obligations) as well as the ability of Japan as an industrialized nation counterpart to facilitate the development of Southeast Asian countries. Strategic competition with China has also fueled an intense race to cultivate relations with ASEAN, and motivated Japan to invite extra-regional partners (such as Australia, New
Zealand, and India) to integration talks in order to balance China's rising influence.
Japan's FTA outcomes reflect these multi-faceted competitive pressures. Japanese
FTAs are selective in that the choice of partners, timing of negotiations, and market access commitments reflect the attempt to restore and/or advance competitive advantage.
For instance, the FTA talks with Mexico and Thailand aimed to level the playing field for Japanese companies; the timing of the ASEAN-Japan FTA is explained by the desire to neutralize the political gains China made by initiating talks with ASEAN first; and the ASEAN + 6 initiative reflects the strong desire to influence the membership and nature of regional integration in East Asia. Japan's FTA policy is indeed heterogeneous in that Japan is pushing for an FTA approach different both from the NAFTA model and the more informal Chinese FTAs.
However, Japan's FTA formula (meager agricultural concessions and multiple WTO plus commitments) may be a hard sell in East Asia. Japanese FTA policy is undercut by the Chinese FTA approach that does not comprise binding new rules on trade and investment, and may be more attuned to the traditional ASEAN way. But the other disadvantage (agricultural protectionism) is self-inflicted, and points to the need to factor in how domestic politics influence a country's response to international FTA diffusion pressures.
International diffusion pressures, domestic policymaking processes
Japan continues to exhibit a bottom-up policy-making pattern, whereby strong policy sub-governments and weak bureaucratic coordination give clout to interest groups and generates a cumbersome negotiation strategy as the conflicting interests of internationalized business sectors and agriculture must be reconciled. These domestic political constraints, therefore, have delayed Japan's FTAs with larger trading partners and/or have generated significant acrimony as smaller FTA counterparts must accept promises of economic assistance instead of market access concessions.
But the domestic politics of Japanese trade policy are in flux with attempts to centralize policymaking and growing divisions among the members of the peak associations for agriculture and business -Nôkyô and Keidanren respectively (see Solís 2008) . One of the most important changes, however, is the growing politicization of trade policy with the more active intervention of politicians attuned to public opinion trends.
Consequently, the traditional separation of politics and economics vis-à-vis China has been harder to maintain and the most consistent demand of the Japanese business community -an FTA with China-has gone unheeded. But the Japanese agricultural lobby also suffered a serious blow as Japan decided to pursue a security-motivated FTA with Australia that will impose much larger adjustment costs on Japanese farming that previous trade deals.
Commercial opportunity versus political rivalry
As the examples above show, the pull and tug of contradictory competitive pressures has presented Japanese policy-makers with a central dilemma: whether to pursue economic opportunity by signing a bilateral FTA with China (that could become the centerpiece for a more cohesive regional integration project) or to respond to political rivalry by developing a competing and overlapping FTA network. This decision will loom large on the nature of regional integration in East Asia. 
